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Developmental systems theory (DST) is a whole-
heartedly epigenetic approach to development,
inheritance and evolution. The developmental
system of an organism is the entire matrix of
resources that are needed to reproduce the life
cycle. The range of developmental resources that
are properly described as being inherited, and
which are subject to natural selection, is far
wider than has traditionally been allowed. Evolu-
tion acts on this extended set of developmental
resources. From a developmental systems perspec-
tive, development does not proceed according to
a preformed plan; what is inherited is much more
than DNA; and evolution is change not only in gene
frequencies, but in entire developmental systems.
Introduction
The phrase ‘developmental system’ was introduced by the biol-
ogist Conrad Waddington to refer to the dynamical system con-
stituted when the totality of the genes in an organism, and their
products, interacts with one another in development (Wadding-
ton, 1952). The developmental system is the locus of the epige-
netic processes by which the genotype gives rise to a phenotype
(Waddington, 1940). Waddington contrasted classical genetic
approaches, which merely correlate genotype and phenotype,
with his own epigenetic approach, which sought to understand the
mechanism connecting the two (Waddington, 2012 [1942], p. 10).
The term ‘epigenesis’ originated in the seventeenth century and
refers to the view that the embryo comes into existence during
development, rather than existing inminiature as suggested by the
opposing preformationist theory. The developmental psychobi-
ologist Gilbert Gottlieb advanced a more radically epigenetic
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perspective than Waddington, distinguishing between what he
termed ‘predetermined’ and ‘probabilistic’ epigenesis (Gottlieb,
1970). In predetermined epigenesis, the contents of the fertilised
egg largely determine the course of development, and the envi-
ronment provides mainly nonspecific support for the unfolding
of the epigenetic process. In probabilistic epigenesis, the course
of development depends on the interaction between each stage
in development and environmental factors at that stage. Research
into this kind of sensitive dependence of development on the envi-
ronment is characteristic of the developmental psychobiology
research tradition and embodies what Gottlieb came to call the
‘developmental psychobiological systems view’ (Gottlieb, 2001).
See also: Epigenetic Variation in Humans; Epigenetic Factors
and Chromosome Organization; Baer, Karl Ernst von
Developmental systems theory also has roots in a tradition
of scepticism about the innate/acquired distinction in American
comparative psychology (Johnston, 2001). This culminated in
an influential critique by Daniel Lehrman, which set the agenda
for much research in developmental psychobiology (Lehrman,
1953). Lehrman’s research, like Gottlieb’s, set out to document
the dependence of development on very specific interactions
between the developing organism and its environment. Behaviour
that had previously been labelled ‘innate’ would turn out to
depend on environmental influences in nonobvious and some-
times surprising ways. To label behaviour as ‘innate’ or ‘instinc-
tive’ is misleading because, as psychologist Zing Yang Kuo
argued, it raises the further question, ‘How are our instincts
acquired?’ (Kuo, 1922).
Susan Oyama added an important element to development sys-
tems theory with her book The Ontogeny of Information: Devel-
opmental Systems and Evolution (Oyama, 1985). The ideas of
genetic information and genetic programs have provided impor-
tant theoretical support for the idea that epigenetic processes are
predetermined by the contents of the fertilised egg. Oyama argued
that the phenotypic significance of a single developmental fac-
tor, genetic or otherwise, is a function of its role in the larger
developmental system. She analysed how the idea of genetic
information has been used to minimise the impact of accepting
that all phenotypes develop through the constructive interaction
of genes and other developmental resources, typically lumped
together as ‘environmental’. See also:Geneticisation: Concept;
Geneticization: Debates and Controversies
The phrase ‘developmental systems theory’ was introduced by
Donald Ford and Richard Lerner as the title of a book setting
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out a systematic research agenda for developmental psychology
which incorporated many of the themes introduced above (Ford
and Lerner, 1992). It was soon applied to Oyama’s critique of
the idea of genetic information (Griffiths and Gray, 1994), and in
many areas of biology the phrase is primarily associated with this
idea (a more detailed history developmental systems theory can
be found in Griffiths and Tabery, 2013).
Epigenesis
It is a truism that all traits are produced by the interaction of
genetic and environmental factors (Kitcher, 2001). DST goes
beyond this conventional interactionism and aims at a truly epige-
netic view of development in the sense described above. The life
cycle of an organism is not prefigured in a genetic program, but is
constructed at each stage in development through the interaction
of organism and environment. Even the production of functional
products from a DNA sequence requires an interaction between
the current state of the genome and the cellular environment, both
of which are products of earlier stages in development, a view that
has been termed ‘molecular epigenesis’ (Stotz, 2006).
The acceptance that every trait depends on both genes and
environment sometimes seems to amount to no more than admit-
ting that every organism must have some environment and some
genes. With that out of the way, the real business of settling what
is due to nature and what to nurture can continue. A whole range
of methods, from the study of twins to Genome Wide Associ-
ation Studies (GWAS), can be used to estimate the correlation
between genes and phenotype in a population. The stronger the
correlation, the more the genes are said to be responsible for the
trait. However, these correlations are not legitimate measures of
causal responsibility; nor do they indicate howmuch a trait can be
modified by environmental changes. Heritability measures can be
increased by choosing a population who all live in similar envi-
ronments. Conversely, heritability can be reduced by choosing
a population of genetically similar organisms. Neither of these
manipulations can reasonably be supposed to alter the relative
causal role of genes and environment in the growth of the trait and
neither has any bearing on how easy it is to modify the trait by
manipulating nongenetic factors. So heritability measures are a
very bad way to measure ‘how genetic’ a trait is, or howmuch it is
due to nature rather than nurture. See also:Genome-Wide Asso-
ciation Studies; Nature/Nurture – A Philosophical Analysis;
Genotype-Phenotype Relationships; Twinning; Twin Studies;
Complex Multifactorial Genetic Diseases
The idea that the genome contains a program for develop-
ment makes it hard to give due weight to context sensitivity and
developmental contingency. As long as the DNA is thought of
as containing information about developmental outcomes, it will
seem sensible to inquire whether outcomes occur because they
are represented in the DNA, or whether they are due to other,
merely material causal influences. Once an outcome is seen as
an expression of the genetic information that controls develop-
ment, it acquires a special status. It represents what the organism
is ‘meant to be’, and deviations from it are misrepresentations
of the true nature of the organism (Linquist et al., 2011). From
this perspective, the effect of context on development appears as
interference with the basic pattern of biological causation. For
DST, however, context sensitivity is what should be expected
from the nature of development. Developmental outcomes are not
preformed or represented in the fertilised egg, but emerge through
the interaction of each stage of the developing organism with its
surroundings. See also: Evolutionary Developmental Biology:
Developmental Bias and Constraint; Environmental Hetero-
geneity: Temporal and Spatial
A key way in which DST tries to improve on the truism that
there is an interaction between genes and environment is by
rejecting that dichotomy itself as inadequate. There are many
influences on development and many ways to group the inter-
actants together. The distinction between genes and every other
causal factor in development (‘environment’) is just one of many
possible distinctions. Moreover, there is a fundamental ‘par-
ity’ (see Box 1) between genes and other causes. The roles
classically played by DNA and RNA sequences are sometimes
filled by other developmental causes. For example, DNA-coding
sequences determine the order of amino acids in proteins, but
environmental signals can also determine this order by causing
alternative splicing or editing of anmRNA transcript. Conversely,
some DNA sequences play roles more usually associated with a
nongenetic factor. For example, chromatin insulator regions of
DNA play a role in the facultative modification of chromatin to
regulate gene expression. Their role is more like the role of epige-
netic mechanisms such as DNA methylation than the role played
by coding regions of the DNA. See also: Imprinting (Mam-
mals); Genetics, Reductionism and Autopoiesis
Another way in which DST tries to move beyond conventional
‘interactionism’ is by recognising that development is a process
of dynamic interaction (Ford and Lerner, 1992). It is dynamic in
the sense that development at each stage builds on the results of
development at an earlier stage. The components built by inter-
action at one stage of development are the components which do
the interacting at a later stage: ‘The interaction out of which the
organism develops is not one, as is so often said, between hered-
ity and environment. It is between organism and environment!
And the organism is different at each stage of its development’
(Lehrman, 1953, p. 345, emphasis in original). Not only the
organism but also the environment changes as a result of develop-
ment. For example, male sexual development in the rat depends
on differential licking of the genital area of male and female
pups by the mother. However, her response to male pups depends
on differences in their urine, which are the result of earlier pro-
cesses of sexual differentiation (Moore, 1992). The presence of
this environmental influence is a feed forward from earlier devel-
opment in the pup itself. See also: History of Developmental
Biology
Distributed Control
As an epigenetic account of development, DST rejects the
widespread idea in contemporary biology that development is
guided by information contained within a ‘genetic program’ (see
Box 2). According to Ernst Mayr, ‘genes are merely the units
of the genetic program that governs the complicated process of
development, ultimately resulting in the phenotypic character’
2 eLS © 2015, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. www.els.net
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Box 1 The Parity Thesis
Susan Oyama (2000a, pp. 200–203) called for parity of reasoning when genetic and other causes play similar roles in
development. The ‘parity thesis’ is the claim that if some role is alleged to be unique to nucleic acids and to justify relegating
nongenetic factors to a secondary role in explaining development, it will turn out on closer examination that this role is not
unique to nucleic acids, but can be played by other factors. Parity is often referred to as ‘causal democracy’ (Kitcher, 2001),
although Oyama herself rejects this label (Oyama, 2000b). Causal democracy is the principle that when an effect depends on
many causes, it is legitimate to investigate the significance of any of those causes, and in particular, that nongenetic causes of
development are not a priori less significant than genetic causes (Kitcher, 2001, p. 290). Both parity and causal democracy are
alleged by critics to amount to a refusal to accept that any cause can ever be more significant or explanatory than another (e.g.
Waters, 2007, Weber, 2006). Advocates of DST have made repeated attempts to rebut this charge (Griffiths and Gray, 2005;
Griffiths and Knight, 1998; Oyama, 2000b, Griffiths, in press).
Box 2 The Phylogeny Fallacy
In 1990, Robert Lickliter and Thomas Berry identified the phylogeny fallacy: the conflation of proximate and evolutionary
explanation (Hochman, 2012). The phylogeny fallacy is committed when an evolutionary ‘why’ answer is given to a proximate
‘how’ question. Explanations that appeal to ‘genetic programs’ are often instances of the phylogeny fallacy because they tend be
evolutionary explanations for why the trait should be considered an adaptation, rather than proximate explanations concerning
the mechanisms underlying that trait. The ‘genetic program’ concept is deduced from the modern synthesis, it is not an object
of empirical investigation. From a DST perspective, assuming adaptations to be preprogrammed into genes is a bad empirical
bet.
(Mayr, 1970, p. 163). This has been the consensus view onde-
velopment since the modern synthesis. The most obvious way
to defend talk of genetic programs and genetic information is
to argue that these concepts are intended in some unproblem-
atic sense to be related to information theory. Two coherent
accounts of ‘genetic information’ can be found in the literature:
a causal account and an intentional account (Sterelny and Grif-
fiths, 1999). Yet, neither account can sustain the view that genes
can be privileged as uniquely informational, or as the locus of a
programme-controlling development.
The causal account of information stems from mathematical
communication theory. According to this account, information
flows through a channel connecting a sender to a receiver. There
is a channel between two systems whenever observing the state
of the receiver reduces uncertainty about the state of the sender.
Channel conditions are other factors that must be in place to
connect the sender and receiver. The channel that connects the
ignition key to an engine has many channel conditions, including
the spark plugs, rotor and ignition coil. However, while it seems
natural to treat turning the key as a ‘signal’ for the engine to start,
and the spark plugs, rotor and ignition coil as channel conditions,
this is a product of our position in the system, not a fact about the
world. For an auto mechanic, the ignition is often not the signal
source. When testing the ignition coil, for instance, it becomes
the signal source, rather than a channel condition. Fundamental
to information theory is the fact that the role of signal source
and channel conditions can be switched. On the causal account,
information is simply covariation.
The attempt to privilege genes as uniquely informational on
the causal account of information fails, as this account creates
parity between DNA and other resources that affect development.
By keeping a matrix of developmental resources constant, genes
can covary with, and therefore give us information about, pheno-
types. However, keep genes constant, and change another devel-
opmental factor, and that factor will give us information about
the phenotype: ‘there is no difficulty in saying that a gene car-
ries information about adult form; an individual with the gene for
achondroplasia will have short arms and legs. But we can equally
well say that a baby’s environment carries information about
growth; if it is malnourished, it will be underweight’ (Maynard
Smith, 2000, p. 189). What was previously considered a channel
condition now provides the source of information. ‘Information
talk’ is thus equally applicable to nongenetic causal factors in
development, according to this account of information.
Maynard Smith (2000) suggested that the causal account of
information does not capture what is really meant when biologists
talk about genetic information. According to Maynard Smith,
biologists use information in a semantic rather than a causal
sense – a gene has an intended meaning rather than just causal
consequences. This allowed him to accept that genes are not
the only developmental causes and not the only factors that are
inherited, while maintaining a fundamental asymmetry between
eLS © 2015, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. www.els.net 3
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genes and other factors. Maynard Smith proposed a ‘teleoseman-
tic’ account of information in biology: a gene contains intentional
information about the phenotype that it has been selected to pro-
duce. The selective retention of advantageous genetic variation
over time produces a ‘genetic program’ in which genes generate
the developmental outcomes that they were selected for.
The problem with this view is that nongenetic developmental
factors have selective histories of their own, and as such they too
contain information about the developmental outcomes in virtue
of which they were selected. The zygote, the first cell formed
when a new organism is produced by means of sexual reproduc-
tion, is a matrix of inherited structures, including basal bodies,
microtubule organising centres, DNA methylation patterns, cyto-
plasmic polarities, membranes and organelles, all of which were
designed by natural selection. For example, chemical gradients in
the zygote activate a small suite of embryonic genes, determining
the basic organisation of the body (front and back, up and down,
etc.). They must also carry intentional information. ‘Informa-
tion talk’, once again, is equally applicable to nongenetic causal
factors in development. Hence, like previous accounts of devel-
opmental information, Maynard Smith’s teleosemantic account
does not achieve its stated aim of generating a distinction between
the role of genes in development and the roles of other causal fac-
tors (Griffiths, 2001, Shea, 2007). See also: Genes: Definition
and Structure; Function and Teleology
Extended Inheritance
A traditional way to privilege genes over other causes in develop-
ment is to argue that genes are the only things organisms inherit
from their ancestors. Hence, the biological nature of organisms
must be in the genes. DST insists on a principled definition of
inheritance. Humans inherit half of their DNA from their mother,
and half from their father. However, we also inherit an extended
set of factors, limited by the number of reliably present resources
that are ‘passed on’ and out of which a life cycle can be recon-
structed. Some of these resources are familiar, such as chromo-
somes, nutrients, ambient temperatures and childcare. Others are
less familiar, despite the recent explosion of work on epigenetic
inheritance (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005). These unfamiliar ingre-
dients include the chromatin-marking system that regulates gene
expression, cytoplasmic chemical gradients and endosymbionts.
Epigenetic inheritance is the transmission of phenotypic vari-
ations to subsequent generations of cells or organisms that do
not stem from changes in DNA base sequences (Jablonka and
Raz, 2009). There are two senses of epigenetic inheritance: cel-
lular epigenetic inheritance and broad epigenetic inheritance.
‘Cellular epigenetic inheritance’ refers to epigenetic transmis-
sion (either organism to organism, or cell to cell) of intracellu-
lar resources (organelles, DNA/histone modifications, feedback
loops and membranes). This includes transmission of chromatin
marks and RNAs (e.g. Wu and Morris, 2001), self-sustaining
metabolic loops and chromatin inheritance in bacteria (Jablonka
and Raz, 2009) and inheritance of alternative protein conforma-
tions such as prions (e.g. Uptain and Lindquist, 2002). Broad epi-
genetic inheritance is the transmission of nonmolecular features
of the developmental system. This includes, but is not limited to,
prenatal signals to the developing foetus (Gluckman and Han-
son, 2004), parental effects generated through developmental
interaction with offspring (e.g. Weaver et al., 2004), symbolic
communication (Richerson and Boyd, 2005) and social learning
(Avital and Jablonka, 2000). See also: Genomic Imprinting at
the Transcriptional Level
‘Niche construction’ is an emerging area of biological research
which draws attention to the importance of extended inheri-
tance (Odling-Smee et al., 1996). However, developmental niche
construction must be distinguished, at least conceptually, from
ecological niche construction (Stotz, 2010). In ecological niche
construction, organisms modify the selection pressures acting
on their descendants by choosing or constructing the environ-
ments in which they and their descendants live. By this means
they influence the direction of evolutionary change. For example,
earthworms modify the soil to provide an aqueous niche. By
doing this, earthworms have evolved very little since migrating
to a terrestrial environment over 50 million years ago (Turner,
2000). In developmental niche construction, organisms structure
the environment in which their descendants will develop, and thus
exert environmental as well as genetic influences on the pheno-
types of their descendants. Niche construction in this sense is the
same thing as extended inheritance. The idea of developmental
niche construction was independently suggested by developmen-
tal psychobiologists Meredith West and Andrew King (West and
King, 1987) who developed the notion of the ‘ontogenetic niche’
to highlight the importance of the ecological and social lega-
cies that are inherited alongside the zygote. This ontogenetic or
developmental niche consists of all the resources that must be
present in addition to the genome if a normal life cycle is to
occur. See also: Ecological Development Biology; Life History
Theory; Morphological Evolution: Epigenetic Mechanisms;
Endosymbionts; Chromatin Remodelling and Histone Mod-
ification in Transcription Regulation; Sociobiology: A Philo-
sophical Analysis
Evolution
‘An animal is, in fact, a developmental system, and it is these
systems, not the mere static adult forms which we conventionally
take as typical of the species, which become modified in the
course of evolution’ (Waddington, 1953, p. 155).
DST expands the domain of evolutionary explanation. Evolu-
tion is not confined to changes in gene frequency, but encom-
passes changes in many classes of developmental resources. In
the earliest stages of DST, one of Lehrman’s primary targets was
the idea that only ‘innate’ traits are explained by evolution, while
‘acquired’ traits must be explained by individual experience. The
issue of whether a trait has an evolutionary explanation is quite
separate from the issue of whether its development depends on
specific features of the environment. As Lehrman argued,
Natural selection acts to select genomes that, in a nor-
mal developmental environment, will guide development
into organisms with the relevant adaptive characteristics.
But the path of development from the zygote stage to the
4 eLS © 2015, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. www.els.net
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phenotypic adult is devious, and includes many develop-
mental processes, including, in some cases, various aspects
of experience’. (Lehrman, 1970, p. 36)
The ‘normal environment’ to which Lehrman refers is the
‘developmental niche’ discussed in the previous section. The
developmental niche is not merely somewhere that the genome
finds itself. It is actively constructed through the activities of
earlier generations, especially parents, and the activity of the
developing organism itself (West and King, 1987). These activi-
ties, as well as the genes with which they interact, are products of
evolution.
DST has been criticised for replacing the clear boundaries of
an organism (but see Bouchard and Huneman, 2013) with the
vague and indeterminate boundaries of a ‘system’. This criticism
seems less telling if we think of the system as a genome plus
the developmental niche. It is uncontroversial that evolution did
not simply design the genome and leave the rest to chance. The
‘aspects of experience’ towhich Lehrman refers are also the result
of evolutionary design – obvious examples include nests, breast
milk and parental care. More broadly, all elements of the develop-
mental niche that mediate adaptive parental effects must, by def-
inition, have been designed by natural selection (Mousseau and
Fox, 1998). However, the role of evolution in designing the niche
goes beyond this. Nearly all mammals can synthesise ascorbic
acid (vitamin C). So the presence of vitamin C in their physical
environment is not part of their developmental niche. However,
primates like ourselves evolved to replace endogenous produc-
tion of vitamin C with environmental sources (Jukes and King,
1975), thus making that aspect of the environment part of the
developmental system. While DST expands the developmental
process to incorporate neglected elements of the developmental
system, it limits those elements to those resources whose pres-
ence in each generation is necessary for the characteristics that
are stably reproduced in the lineage.
Enthusiasts and sceptics about the evolutionary significance
of extended inheritance often seem to agree that its significance
depends on how reliably nongenetic factors are inherited across
evolutionary time, and on thus how similar nongenetic resources
are to genes (Jablonka and Raz, 2009). DST takes a rather dif-
ferent perspective. For DST, extended inheritance is simply one
aspect of how developmental systems reproduce themselves. It
is not important because it is a separate evolutionary process in
which nongenetic factors evolve in a way that parallels genetic
evolution. The primary reason that extended inheritance mat-
ters is because genetic and nongenetic factors evolve together
as components of evolving developmental systems (Griffiths and
Gray, 2004). It is uncontroversial to point out that when par-
ents influence offspring phenotypes through nongenetic means,
this must be included in a population genetic model, if that
model is to make correct predictions about either phenotypic
or genetic change (Wolf and Wade, 2009). So from the DST
perspective, nongenetic heredity is not important because it mir-
rors genetic heredity. It is important because the mechanisms of
heredity, whatever they are, affect the dynamics of evolution. See
also: Developmental Evolution; Evolution of Development;
Lorenz, Konrad Zacharias
Criticisms of DST
Through its focus on causal
interconnectedness DST makes actual
causal analysis impossible
If, in order to analyse development, one has to analyse the
entire developmental system, DST would be doomed to failure
by its own inclusiveness. However, DST takes a more strategic
approach to complexity. As Oyama (2000b) has argued, DST
does not render causal analysis impossible; on the contrary, it
makes it more precise and more ample: more precise by dis-
couraging overgeneralisations, more ample by broadening the
scope of potentially significant developmental resources. Any
investigation of complex phenomena requires a certain amount of
‘black boxing’. Developmental systems theorists practice ‘tacti-
cal’ black boxing, in that it is always provisional and driven by
pragmatic concerns.
DST is ‘armchair philosophy’
This criticism seems to derive from a simple misunderstanding.
Developmental systems theorists include philosophers, psychol-
ogists and biologists. They have often published in philosophy
journals on the merits of DST. However, the disciplinary home of
DST is not philosophy but biology and psychobiology (see Intro-
duction). DST is not a philosophical offering to biology, but rather
an attempt to abstract a theoretical framework from the work of
a set of developmentally minded scientists (Griffiths and Gray,
2005).
DST makes no speciﬁc predictions
In a particularly strong attack on DST, Tooby et al. claim that
‘developmental systems theory makes no specific predictions
of any sort and thus is useless as a scientific theory’ (Tooby
et al., 2003, p. 860). This criticism may in part derive from
the name ‘developmental systems theory’. DST is not a ‘theory’
in the hypothetico-deductive sense. Rather, it is a biological
framework (Godfrey-Smith, 2001). The fact that it makes no
specific predictions is not a problem. The same could be said of
evolutionary developmental biology, or of the ‘genes-eye view’.
However, like those other perspectives it does make general
predictions: that development has no single locus of control, that
the impact of any given cause is contingent upon the state of the
system as a whole, that the notion of the ‘genetic program’ is of
little heuristic value, that the study of heredity will benefit by an
inclusive approach and that Lehrman’s ‘aspects of experience’,
as well as genes, can be explained by natural selection.
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